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Autonomy and the OrtJwdoxy ofHuman Superiority 
On the last page of the article Gaylin uses language to 
indicate his view of the superiority of the human to the 
nonhuman: "If the love and caring are supplied only 
minimally, he [a human being] may survive as a biological 
entity without the qualities of humanness that elevate him 
above the common animal host. If at any key point an 
individual is withdrawn from contact with his kind, he may 
recreate social relationships in his imagination that sustain 
him for a time, but he suffers the risk of being reduced to an 
animal indistinguishable from lower forms"(p. 72, italics 
mine). But there is no argument at all in the paper to the 
effect that we alone are moral animals, and no argument for 
the superiority of human to nonhuman animals. The focus 
of the article is chiefly a discussion of the emotion of guilt. 
What distinguishes the human from the nonhuman, however, 
is instead the focus of the abstract, as is Gaylin's claim that 
human beings are defined as the only moral animal. That 
claim is relevant to the topic of this paper. 
8 Gaylin, "Feeling," op. cit., p. 72. 
9 Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of 
Morals(NewYork: Bobbs-MerrillCompany, 1959): 414,p. 31. 
10 Levertov, op. cit. 
11 R. G. Frey, 'The Significance ofAgency and Marginal 
Cases," Philosophica 39 (1987), p. 40. 
12 I may also be less satisfied when I reach the vista-if 
my expectations are too high-precisely because of my 
forward-looking approach. But that is the third problem with 
Frey's argument, thatjudgmentalness (concomitant with high 
expectations) diminishes the felt satisfactions even of 
experiences that would have been perfectly satisfactory 
otherwise. 
13 Zen Flesh, Zen Bones (Garden City, New York: Anchor 
Books, 1957), ed. by Paul Reps, p. 18. 
14 Leo Tolstoy, The Death ofIvan Ilych (New York: New 
American Library, 1960), pp. 147-148 and 152. 
15 Although Ivan Ilych is a fictional character created by 
Tolstoy, Tolstoy's characterization of one progression of 
attitudes and insights through the dying experience has been 
confirmed as both realistic and not uncommon by those who 
work with the dying, according to conversations with Marion 
Wilson Gruzalski, who has founded two hospices, developed 
a third, and consulted for many more. 
16 Derrick Jensen, Listening to the Land: Conversations 
about Nature, Culture, and Eros (San Francisco: Sierra Club 
Books, 1995), p. 6. Dave Forman is the founder of the activist 
group Earth First! and, more recently, the Wilderness Project. 
17 From "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell," in Bly, op. 
cit., p. 41. 
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In a number of recent articles on animal issues, I I have 
set out one view of the comparative value of human 
and animal life. It is a view consonant both with my 
earlier writings on animals2 and with the emphasis upon 
quality of life accounts of the value of life that are so 
much a part of contemporary writing in medical ethics 
and in applied ethics generally. Numerous details of 
this quality of life view remain to be filled in, of course, 
but its general outline, I think, is clear enough. Even in 
general outline, however, some philosophers and others 
have found the view wanting, if not in its entirety, then 
certainly in some of its more prominent features. One 
feature that has proved especially controversial is that 
the value of some human lives can turn out to be of a 
quality so low as to be exceeded in value by the lives of 
some perfectly healthy animals, which in tum can have 
implications for, say, which creatures are to be used in 
medical experimentation. Another such feature, it would 
appear, has been my remarks on the role of autonomy 
in the value of human, as opposed to, animallives.3 
Bart Gruzalski's paper "Autonomy and The Myth of 
Human Superiority" is very much in this latter vein. I 
should like here briefly to respond to some of 
Gruzalski's comments, before trying to bring more 
sharply into focus certain features of the comparative 
view of the value of human and animal life that I hold. 
(In what follows, I leave aside Gruzalski's remarks on 
other philosophers.) 
In a way, it is odd that Gruzalski puts me in the 
camp of those who espouse human "superiority." Most 
DISCUSSION 
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often, over the comparative value of human and animal 
life, I am found by medical experimenters and others 
in the scientific community to be far too pro animal. 
Concerning the value of life, far from asserting any 
human superiority tout court, I have laid out in a large 
number of papers4 all kinds of situations in which the 
value of an animal's life can exceed that of a human 
life. To be sure, the human life in question may be an 
unfortunate or tragic one, but that only makes the point, 
which I stress repeatedly, that not all human lives have 
the same value as normal adult human life. So any 
thought that I afftrnl a blanket superiority of the value 
of human over animal life is mistaken; indeed, it is 
precisely because I know of nothing that to my mind 
supports any such blanket claim that many feel I have, 
at least in the area of experimentation, gone too far in 
the animal direction. Certainly, my position is radically 
different from that, say, of Carl Cohen, who, as best I 
can tell, asserts rather confidently such a human 
superiority.s 
When I began developing my views on the 
comparative value of human and animal lives, I was 
aware that my choosing to use the word "autonomy" to 
characterize the general phenomenon of choosing and 
living out some conception of the good, of choosing a 
kind of life for oneself and molding and shaping one's 
day to day living in order to live out that life, could 
prove confusing. It could encourage someone to think 
that autonomy played a role in my conception of the 
value of a life that it played, e.g., in Kant or other 
deontological theorists. I thought my discussion of the 
matter, especially my avowal that autonomy was only 
an instrumental good, protected me from this confusion. 
Apparently, however, this is not the case. Thus, in 
what Gruzalski refers to as the "consensus view" of the 
value of a life, which he maintains I share, it is claimed 
that "human life, because ofautonomy, is more valuable 
than nonhuman life." Later, he characterizes the 
consensus view as the claim that "our lives are more 
valuable than the lives of nonhuman animals because 
of a richness in our lives that derives from autonomy 
and autonomy-based abilities..." (italics in original). 
Still later, he speaks of the consensus view as claiming 
that our lives are "more valuable than the lives of 
nonhuman animals because we are autonomous...." I 
do not believe these things, at least if the word "because" 
in each case means what it usually means. For what all 
of these claims do is to ascribe to autonomy an 
importance and value that it does not have in my view. 
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Rather, I hold the view that autonomy can be, and in 
the case of normal adult humans usually is, the source 
of additional value in a life, where that value is 
determined by all the experiences, and by all the kinds 
of experiences, that go to make up the life in question. 
I shall return to this matter below. 
So far as I am concerned, Gruzalski makes three 
points. First, have goals, ends, desires, and a 
conception of the good life and, because these can all 
be frustrated, disappointment and/or suffering can 
occur. Second, have a conception of the good life and 
seek to mold and shape one's life according to it and, 
because one can be overly preoccupied with planning 
one's life, one can fail to live for tlle moment or to 
live spontaneously and, so, fail to obtain those goods 
that such living makes possible. Third, what Gruzalski 
calls "judgmentalness"-the judgment that "things are 
not good enough the way they are"-can undermine 
the satisfaction that our present feelings, experiences, 
and relationships would otherwise confer upon us. 
In a way, these strike me as rather odd criticisms, 
since they all amount to claims about what might 
happen, in the absence of any explanation, particularly 
any causal explanation, of why they will happen. Even 
if all these things are possible, however, left in the very 
general terms in which they are couched, it is not easy 
to see what of any great significance ensues. 
It is perfectly true that, if we rid ourselves of all 
goals, ends, desires, and conceptions of the good life, 
then we will not be disappointed through failing to 
achieve or satisfy some of these. What exactly do we 
make of this fact? Do we tell our children, "Do not 
seek anything," "Strive for nothing," "Have no ambition 
to make something of yourself'? Plainly, we do not: 
striving, even with the added prospect of failure that it 
opens up for us, is an important part, not only of what 
we make ofour lives, but also of their value; and though 
disappointment often attends the failure fully to achieve 
what we strive for, we counsel our children to stretch 
themselves to the full. As it were, the journey, as much 
as the arrival, enriches a life. That is why people often 
say, even when they have failed, that the attempt was 
nevertheless worth it. 
Part of what may have gone wrong here is that 
Gruzalski may have taken my notion of the richness of 
a life as a way to refer, as it were, to the quantity of 
experiences crammed into a life without regard to the 
various kinds of experiences tlley are. One of tlle reasons 
we want our children to stretch themselves to the full is 
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that we know that there are all kinds or sorts of 
experiences that life has to offer, and sampling them is 
part of what we refer to when we say of someone that 
s/he led a "rich, full" life. Such a statement does not 
refer to a single dimension of experience, say, the 
pleasure to be had from consuming desserts endlessly; 
it refers to the multiple dimensions of the lives we 
associate with normal adult humans. At times, Gruzalski 
seems to write as if "felt satisfaction" meant pleasure; 
but I am not a hedonist. I have all kinds of desires the 
fulfillment of which involve me in all kinds of 
experiences; I may feel pleasure as the result of desire-
satisfaction, but there is no necessity in this and certainly 
no identity between desire-satisfaction and pleasure. 
Of course, the multi-dimensionality of normal adult 
human lives means that the chances for desire-
frustration are greater perhaps than if we had only a 
single dimension to our lives, but even desire-frustration 
does not lead most of us to look back and claim that 
our Iives would have been more valuable still if we had 
had only one kind of desire and if that kind of desire 
was one we could easily satisfy. The richness of our 
lives is not some mechanical adding together of our 
pleasurable experiences, so that, if we could only stuff 
ourselves with the desserts that we love, we should 
achieve the richest, the supreme life of all. All of us 
want lives for ourselves that contain more than desserts; 
we want a full array of experiences over a broad range 
of the sorts of activities that go to make up the lives of 
normal adult humans. 
The lives of nonnal adult humans contain all manner 
of experiences that go to make up its content, where 
the variety ofkinds ofexperiences on offer for many of 
us is precisely part of the attraction of trying to live a 
full life. Birth, marriage, encounters, partings, divorce, 
hate, love, jealousy, suspicion, battle, war, death: things 
like this go to make up many of our lives and fonn 
some of the benchmarks by which we in part try to 
assess them, even though, at the time, hedonistically, 
things looked rather bleak. What the person who eats 
only desserts has missed is all the other various 
dimensions in which normal adult humans can live their 
lives, and when we pity those humans among us who 
do not have normal adult human lives we in part do so, 
not because we think, hedonistically, that their lives 
contain less pleasure than ours, but because we know 
that they will not be able to live lives the various 
dimensions of which look anything like those present 
in normal adult human lives. They will live human lives; 
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they are, obviously, human. But they will not live human 
lives anything like what such lives can be, when all the 
various dimensions ofhuman life are taken into account; 
and what they will be judged to be short on. is not 
pleasurable experiences (they mayor may not be short 
on these) but on all the kinds of experiences that can go 
to make up human lives. In short, we have an idea of 
what it is to live a rich, full life, of what it is to have a 
life that develops and stretches our talents in ways which 
indicate the full dimensions of what human life can be 
like. Eating desserts comes nowhere near capturing 
these dimensions. It seems an obvious truth that we 
desire more things than pleasure, an obvious truth that 
desire-satisfaction can be felt or experienced without 
any accompanying pleasure, and an obvious truth that 
pleasure comes nowhere near exhausting all of what 
life has to offer. Pain and suffering often attend the 
attempts to satisfy desires that stretch us in particular 
ways, but where these desires form part of our 
conception of the good, we rarely give up those desires 
for that reason alone. 
As for living spontaneously, how exactly are we to 
interpret this injunction? There are neurosurgeons, 
librarians, athletes, and pianists: how exactly are they 
to live spontaneously? Does this injunction mean that 
these individuals must not have professions in the first 
place? But then how are they to live? And what kind of 
society is Gruzalski envisaging for us, when professions 
and otller ways of organizing our lives are put aside in 
favor of spontaneous living? In fact, all Gruzalski's 
point comes to is me caution mat we can become too 
pre-occupied with an organized life and a job or 
profession and so fail to capture in our lives many of 
the otller good things mat life has to offer. But this 
caution is already widely heeded: no one is a 
schoolteacher or pilot twenty-four hours a day, and it is 
easily possible in one's other time to experience all that 
Gruzalski describes, from good meals and the 
enjoyment of nature to reading the religious and quasi-
religious thinkers that Gruzalski quotes in his paper. 
We all know this; that is why so many of us seek to 
develop the various dimensions through which humans 
can live their lives. We become cooks or athletes; we 
read poetry and novels; we watch baseball games and 
look at movies; we go for walks and camp in the 
mountains; we go to PTA meetings and attend 
neighborhood watch committees. The list is almost 
endless of the sorts of activities and experiences that 
we think make up the lives of normal adult humans, 
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including those who have professions. Ofcourse, there 
will be people who neglect this kind of development, 
who are so single-minded in their pursuit of some end 
that that end comes to absorb their lives and so to 
squeeze out the pursuitofother ends. Far from regarding 
such a person as exemplifying all that normal adult 
human life can be, however, we actually regard such 
people as having missed a huge number of the 
dimensions ofnormal adult human life that can soenrich 
it. Balance in our lives, balance, e.g., between our 
professions and the other things that life has to offer, 
is required, and most of us have to work at achieving 
such balance, given how jobs and professions, with 
their implications for financial livelihood, can come 
to absorb us. 
Moreover, I certainly reject the thought that animals 
are more "natural" and so "superior" to us because they 
do not require cognition or comparatively advanced 
rationality in order to live the lives appropriate to their 
species. There is nothing "unnatural" or "artificial" 
about cognition, rationality, or conceptualizing 
experience, and it is only a piece of romanticism, along 
the lines of painting pre-civilized men as "noble" 
savages or of suggesting that everything since the wheel 
has been corruption or a part of the "rat race," to pretend 
otherwise. The use of cognition, rationality, and 
conceptualization in no way renders a life ignoble per 
se, as one uses these further to enrich a life, even though 
it is true that these same characteristics can be used in 
morally wrong or dubious endeavors. For the fact of 
the matter is, at least on my view, that there is no inherent 
correlation between morality/immorality and a valuable 
life; even immoral people, people who, e.g., use their 
intellectual endowments to visit misery upon their 
neighbors, can have valuable lives. 
The '~udgmental" point that Gruzalski makes admits 
of a reply similar to that given with respect to the 
spontaneity charge. My pursuit of some conception of 
the good may indeed lead me to become dissatisfied 
with the way I am living my life at present and so may 
result in my not getting out of my present way of living 
all that it has to offer; but there is no necessity about 
this, and we require some argument to indicate why we 
should think any such failure to be inevitable. Even this, 
I am inclined to say, gives more credence to the point 
than it deserves; for, at least in some of the circum-
stances I have been describing thus far, being 
dissatisfied with the way one is presently living 
requires us to say in which dimensions of living we 
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find our life unsatisfactory. We look for those things 
that we feel we are being shortchanged over. We may 
have plenty of desserts and, so, pleasure in our lives, 
yet still fmd life unsatisfactory; this is not all that bad a 
thing, if it leads us to reflect that life has more to offer 
than our present way of living realizes for us. Once 
more, we do not judge one human life more successful 
than another merely through adding up pleasurable 
experiences and finding that one life contains 13 such 
experiences and the other 12. Ifany hedonist/utilitarian 
has ever thought this, it is because s/he has had, I think, 
an impoverished value theory. 
It should now be evident why Gruzalski's points 
miss the thrust behind the claim that autonomy can be 
used to augment the value of a life. That Uuust is not 
one of inevitability or certainty that possession of 
autonomy will inevitably or certainly enhance the value 
of a life (still less is it that autonomy per se makes 
human life more valuable than animal life). Rather, the 
thrust is that autonomy can be used for that purpose. 
In my view, autonomy is instrumentally, not 
intrinsically, valuable. Its value depends upon the uses 
made of it, and, in the case of normal adult humans, 
those possible usages make all kinds of experiences 
available. To direct one's own life to secure what one 
wants, to make one's own choices as to spouse, job, 
and other significant affairs of life, to assume 
responsibility over a domain of one's life and so acquire 
a certain sense of freedom to act, to decide how one 
will live and to mold and shape one's life accordingly: 
these are the sorts of things that open up areas of 
enrichment in a life, with consequent effect upon that 
life's quality and value. They are things which show us 
living lives of multiple dimensions, which show whole 
ranges of experiences open to us by our having chosen 
to live this way as opposed to that. Equally, however, it 
is possible that nothing of the sort will issue from the 
exercise of one's autonomy; just because a life's value 
can be augmented through the exercise of autonomy in 
no way shows that it inevitably or always is so 
augmented. But it would be a mistake to overlook 
exactly what molding and shaping our lives in ways of 
our own choosing opens up to us, in tenns of ranges of 
experiences that become available to us, e.g., through 
actually living the life of an athlete or pianist, and that 
we subsequently so avidly pursue. 
The point behind the above discussion, of course, is 
to indicate ways in which the value of nonnal adult 
human lives can be augmented, ways in which humans 
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can open up wider dimensions in which they can live 
their lives, ways which are arguably deprived animals. 
Il does not follow that animal life has no value 
(precisely the opposite is my view) or that animal life 
cannot have greater value than some human life (again, 
precisely the opposite is my view). Rather, what is 
centrally at issue is the comparative value of normal 
adult human life and animal life and how we are to go 
about deciding the matter. 
On this issue of comparative value, Gruzalski is also 
unhelpful. Certainly, if we adopt some Eastern religion 
or some form of quasi-religious metaphysic or some 
"New Age" mantra, it is very possible that we might 
come to have a different view of animals and of how 
we stand to them. Indeed, we might come to take a 
different view of our relations to the animal kingdom 
(and the inanimate environment as well) without any 
specific religious impulses at all. This much is clear to 
all of us, through poetry, through cultural differences 
we encounter amongst the individuals who make up 
our society, and through exposure to the art of different 
ages and cultures. From these different, possible views 
of our relations to animals different, possible accounts 
of the comparative value of human and animal life may 
flow. Again, this much seems clear. But from the mere 
fact that there are different, possible accounts of tllis 
comparative value nothing follows per se about the 
adequacy of any single one. Argument must establish 
the soundness of such accounts, and if, e.g., one's claims 
about comparative value turn upon one's adoption of 
an Eastern religion or some religious or "New Age" 
metaphysic, then it is that religion or metaphysic that 
must be subjected to scrutiny. Merely to be able, within 
the fabric of that religion or metaphysic, to tell stories 
tlle purport of which is to have us believe all manner of 
things of animals and the value of their lives is not the 
kind of scrutiny of a view or metaphysic that is required. 
My own account of how we are to decide the 
comparative value of human and animal life must 
equally be subject to scrutiny; that is, at the very least, 
I must have something to say, in addition to trying to 
assess the comparative value of these lives, for going 
about assessing it in the way I do. I have a number of 
reasons in this regard, but I have space here for only a 
few words on one of them. 
One of the strengths of my position on the value of 
human and animal life, I believe, is that it coheres 
nicely with recent discussions of the value of life in 
medical ethics and allied areas: in a word, what matters 
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is not life but quality of life. The value of a life is a 
function of its quality, its quality of its richness, and 
its richness of its capacities and scope for enrichment. 
It matters, then, what a creature's capacities for a rich 
life are. The question is not whether a mouse's life 
has value; I agree that it does. The mouse, just like a 
man, has an unfolding series of experiences and can 
suffer, and it is perfectly capable of living out a life 
appropriate to its species. The question is about the life 
appropriate to its species. The question is whether the 
mouse's life approaches nonnal adult human life in 
quality (and so value), given its capacities and what 
these indicate about a life appropriate to its species, 
and this is a matter of the comparative value of such 
lives. It is on this basis, on the basis of greater richness 
and greater potentialities for enrichment that the claim 
that normal adult human life is more valuable than 
animal life takes shape and is defended. Since not all 
human lives have the same richness or potentiality for 
enrichment, however, not all human lives are equally 
valuable. In fact, some human lives can be so blighted, 
with little or no prospect for enrichment, that the quality 
of such lives can fall well below that of ordinary, healthy 
animals. I take the case of anencephalic infants, the brain 
dead, and those in tlle latter stages of senile dementia 
to be cases in point. 
Plainly, then, the animal case receives no different 
treatment from the human case: both turn upon quality 
of life views and accounts of the richness and the scope 
for enrichment of the lives in question. Such a view 
of the value of life is not speciesist in any first-order 
sense (nor, as we shall see, in a second-order sense), 
wherein value questions are decided upon the basis of 
species membership. 
Quality of life views of the sort described turn upon 
richness, and if we are to answer the question of the 
comparative value of human and animal life, we must 
inquire after the richness of their respective lives. 
Intra-species comparisons are sometimes difficult, as 
we learn in medical ethics, when we try to judge the 
respective quality of life of each of two human lives, 
but such comparisons are not completely beyond us. 
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They are made every day in our hospitals, in order, e.g., 
to allocate resources, etc. Inter-species comparisons of 
richness and quality of life are likely to be even more 
difficult, though again not impossible. Certainly, as we 
descend from the "higher" animals, we are likely to 
lose all behavioral correlates that we use to gain access 
to the interior lives of animals. Yet, more and more 
scientific work constantly appears that gives us a 
glimpse into animal lives, whether in captivity or in 
the wild. So, exactly how much we can know of the 
inner experiences of animals, of their subjective lives 
matters to our judgment of the value of their lives, 
just as it does in our case. 
In our attempt to grasp the subjective experiences 
ofanimals, we must not use in some unreflective manner 
criteria appropriate for assessing the richness of human 
lives as if they applied straightforwardly to the animal 
case. I am not a speciesist in this second-order sense 
either. Rather, much as ethologists and animal 
behaviorists do, we must use all that we know about 
animals, especially those closest to us, in order to try to 
gauge the quality of their lives in terms appropriate to 
their species. Then, we must try to understand to what 
we allude when we speak of rich, full lives for mice 
and men. The fullest mouse life there has ever been, so 
science would seem at the moment to suggest, does not 
approach the full life of a human; the difference in 
capacities, and what these additional capacities make 
possible by way of further dimensions to human 
existence, is just too great. So, ifone nevertheless wants 
to maintain that the mouse's life is as valuable as the 
life of a normal adult human, then it must be that, 
whatever the capacities of the mouse and however 
limited those capacities may be in depth and extent, 
they confer a richness upon the mouse's life that 
approximates the richness of the human's life, with all 
its different and additional capacities, and the ranges 
ofexperiences these make possible, in the typical human 
case. Evidence is needed to support this claim, since 
we will not ordinarily think this of tlle mouse by its 
behavior alone. 
If we are to work with a quality of life view of the 
value of a life, both human and animal, then we must 
try imaginatively to place ourselves in the mouse's 
position, with the capacities and life of the mouse. 
Difficult, yes, but not impossible. 
One might try to block my judgment of reduced 
richness in the animal case by dropping the provision 
that quality of life is determined by richness. But if it is 
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not to be determined by richness, that is, by the extent, 
variety, depth, and quality ofexperiences, I do not know 
what else is to determine it. 
Why cannot we say that the mouse and the man have 
different capacities and lives, so that, judged by their 
respective capacities, each leads a rich, full though 
different life? The problem here has a deeper aspect: 
one seems to be saying that these lives, and so the 
ingredients that make up these lives, are in some sense 
incommensurable, when, in fact, the central ingredients, 
namely, experiences and the unfolding of experiences 
in a life, appear remarkably alike. Can I know what it's 
like to be a dog? To a more or less extent. That is why 
I think playing with a dog enriches its life. Can I know 
exactly how much it enriches its life? No, just as I 
sometimes cannot know the degree of enrichment in 
the case of humans. But I have no reason whatever to 
believe that the dog's life possesses anything like the 
variety and depth of ways of enrichment that my life 
possesses, and I need evidence to make me believe that 
enrichment of the dog's life through any single one of 
its capacities could make up for this extent and variety 
in my case. To be sure, the eagle can see further and 
deeper that I can, but how does this fact transform the 
richness of its life to approximate the richness that all 
the variety and depth of my capacities confers upon 
me? I need evidence to believe that it does. 
I doubt, then, that there are incommensurabilities 
present here, so that I am not thereby in principle denied 
access to the animal case. In the end, I believe that this 
is the most important point to establish, in order to 
pursue and to have any hope of resolving the 
comparative value questions; for this point would in 
tum tend to support the view that the difficulties in fully 
assessing the quality of life of at least the "higher" 
animals are ones of degree, not of kind. 
With a quality of life view of the value of a life that 
takes the above form, it will not be true that all human 
lives are equally valuable, whatever tlleir richness or 
scope for enrichment. I reject the so-called argument 
from "marginal cases" (tragic human cases) then, 
because the point about differing degrees of richness 
and scope for enrichment settles the question ofwhether 
human lives can have differing qualities and, so, values. 
One cannot use this argument over unfortunate humans, 
therefore, to try to squeeze in a claim for equal quality 
and value for animal lives. 
Let me stress, then, that on a quality of life view of 
the value of a life of the sort sketched, the human and 
Between the Species 
Frey: Response 
animal cases are seen as remarkably alike in the role 
that experiences and experiences unfolding in a life play. Reply:
What the animal case has to contend with, so far as 
normal adult humans are concerned, is the extent, 
variety, quality, and depth of experiences that are 
available to humans through the multiple dimensions 
of our lives, some of which are made available to us 
through the exercise of our autonomy. Nothing in all 
this says that human lives are more valuable than animal 
lives because they are autonomous lives; all autonomy 
does, at best, is to make ranges of experiences available 
to humans. Even without autonomy, animal lives are 
valuable, since animals remain experiential creatures, 
but without autonomy, human lives are not as valuable 
as they can be, since the full range of the experiences 
such lives are capable of through the additional 
capacities that normal adult human lives typically 
possess is not present. 
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The best-laid schemes 0' mice an' men 
Gang aft aglay, 
An' lea'e us naught but grief an' pain, 
For promised joy!" 
Robert Burns} 
Philosophers have cited autonomy as the reason for 
thinking that the lives ofnonnal adult humans are more 
valuable than the lives of nonhuman animals. In 
"Autonomy and the Orthodoxy of Human Superiority" 
(hereafter, "Orthodoxy"), I questioned what value 
autonomy adds to a life: are our lives better off because 
we are autonomous and therefore have the ability to 
pursue what we think of as the "good life"? Ifwe take an 
external perspective, the answer is plausibly negative: 
because ofour pursuits of what we think is a "good life," 
we have committed genocide, created nuclear weapons, 
caused numerous extinctions, and wrecked havoc on the 
earth's ecosystem. But if we take an inner perspective, it 
seems plausible that an ability to choose our own idea of 
the good life and mold our life to accommodate that idea 
adds positive value to that life. 
This value might be added in one of two ways. It 
could be that our lives are inherently more valuable 
because of these capacities or that our lives are more 
valuable because of the instrumental value of these 
capacities. R. G. Frey holds the instrumental position, 
claiming that the exercise of autonomy enriches a life, 
causing "considerable satisfaction." In investigating 
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